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Baby Steps Not Leaps, Toward Relief: Anatomizing Sadkett v.
EPA
Sackett v. E.P.A.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to former presidential hopeful Mitt Romney, "an
unelected government bureaucrat robbed them of their freedom ... they
were given no recourse, no remedy. They could do what the E.P.A.
wanted, or they could risk millions of dollars in fines." 2 Justice Scalia
believed the edict "show[ed] the high-handedness of the E.P.A." The two
men were speaking of an administrative compliance order issued to an
Idaho couple by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") alleging
they filled in "wetlands" subject to EPA jurisdiction under the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"). The order demanded the couple to undertake costly
remediation efforts or pay huge fines for non-compliance- and all without
any opportunity for court review.
The EPA is authorized to issue compliance orders to enforce
provisions of the CWA; the Clean Air Act ("CAA"); the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA");
and the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA"), in addition to other
legislation.4 The EPA issues over one thousand compliance orders per
year, of which over four hundred are under the CWA. 5 These orders have
been controversial for many years because those who receive them are
' 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
2

Ashley Parker, FArmeyAsails1PgulatoryDrain on Economy, N.Y. TIMES: THE

CAUCUS (Mar. 19, 2012, 3:45 PM),
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/19/romney-assails-regulatory-drain-oneconomy/.
3 Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) (No. 101062).
4 %e ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT TRENDS (Oct.

2011), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/nets/nets-e4-acos.pdf
[hereinafter "ENFORCEMENT TRENDS"] (providing per year averages for years 2001 to
2011).

s Id
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typically liable for profusely large fines. Recipients who believe an order
was unjustifiably issued to them have little recourse against the powerful
enforcement mechanisms available to the agency. Until the Supreme
Court's recent decision in %ckett v. EPA every federal circuit court
hearing the issue had rejected judicial review of the EPA's jurisdiction and
power to issue these compliance orders. 6
The following comment anatomizes the Supreme Court's ruling in
&ckett v. EPA an appeal from the Ninth Circuit - a ruling that for the
first time allows pre-enforcement judicial review of administrative
compliance orders. 7 Many believe that the Supreme Court's decision will
provide much relief to those who feel they have been harmed by a
wrongfully issued administrative compliance order.8 Although the Court's
ruling constitutes a major change in the law, this comment will analyze the
legal magnitude of this change and whether it truly provides the
protections many hoped it would.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Michael and Chantell Sackett are owners of a residential lot
comprising about two-thirds of an acre in Bonner County, Idaho.9 The
Sacketts' lot is in close proximity to Priest Lake, yet separated from the
lake by several other lots containing permanent structures. 10 In April and
6

Jonathan Kalmuss-Katz,

SAprert Court eapandsjudicial review over EPA corrpliance

orderg SPR ENVTL. L. BLOG (Mar. 22, 2012, 2:08 PM),
http://blog.sprlaw.com/2012/03/supreme-court-expands-judicial-review-over-epacompliance-orders/.
7 Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
8

Theckettsandthe Clen Water Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,2012, at Al8, availableat

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/opinion/the-sacketts-and-the-clean-wateract.html? r-=0.

9 hcket, 132 S. Ct. at 1370.
10Id. The Sackett's circuit court appellate brief described their property: "Between the
property (south of Old Schneider Road) and Priest Lake are several developed lots with
numerous permanent structures. There is no surface water connection between the
property and Kalispell Creek. Further, there is no surface water connection between the
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May of 2007, the Sacketts filled in part of their lot with rock and dirt in

preparation for building a house."
Shortly after filling in their lot, the Sacketts received a letter of
compliance from the EPA alleging: (1) their Bonner County property
contained federally protected wetlands;' 2 (2) those wetlands were adjacent
to "navigable waters" protected by the CWA,13 (3) on or about April and
May 2007, the Sackets discharged fill material into one half acre of
wetlands; and (4) that allowing and continuing to allow such fill material
to enter protected waters without a permit violates the CWA.14 Based on
these findings, the EPA directed the Sacketts to immediately restore the
property and to produce documents relating to the condition of the site.' 5
The Sacketts contended their property was not subject to the
jurisdiction of the EPA under the CWA.' 6 After the EPA denied their
request for a hearing on the matter, the Sacketts brought an action under

property and Priest Lake. The Sacketts bought the land to build a house on; they have
obtained all the necessary state and local permits to build their house." Brief of PlaintiffsAppellants at 6, Sackett v. EPA, 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-35854).
" ckett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370-71.
12 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)
(2013).
1333 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2013); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2
(2013).
14 %ckett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370-71.
15 Id at 1371. The order required the Sacketts to "immediately undertake activities to
restore the Site in accordance with an EPA-created Restoration Work Plan and to provide
and/or obtain access to the Site ...and access to all records and documentation related to
the conditions at the Site.. .to EPA employees and/or their designated representatives."
Id More specifically, "the order mandated that the fill material be removed by April 15,
2008, and that the property be replanted by April 30, 2008. Further, the order required
that the site be fenced off for three growing seasons. Lastly, the order stated that failure to
comply with the order may subject [the Sacketts] to civil penalties of up to $ 32,500 per
day and administrative penalties of up to $ 11,000 per day for each continuing violation.
Appellants' Opening Brief at 5-6, Sackett v. EPA, 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 0835854).
16

ckett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
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the Administrative Procedure Act 7 ("APA") in United States District
Court for the District of Idaho seeking judicial review of the EPA's
decision in addition to declaratory and injunctive relief.18 The Sacketts
claimed the issuance of the compliance order was "arbitrary and
capricious" under the APA and violated their Fifth Amendment due
process rights.19
Meanwhile, the EPA contended the compliance order was not
subject to judicial review for several reasons: (1) the compliance order
was not a final agency action because the order invited the Sacketts to
engage in an informal hearing with the EPA to discuss any allegations
they believed to be inaccurate;2o (2) the CWA provides for judicial review
to be brought under 33 U.S.C. § 1319 and APA review can only be sought
where no other adequate remedy is available; 2 1 and ( the CWA creates a
statutory scheme that precludes APA judicial review.
The district court dismissed the Sackett's action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.2 3 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the EPA's
third argument, and concluded the CWA "precludes pre-enforcement
judicial review of compliance orders, and that such preclusion does not
violate the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee." 24 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the CWA
precludes pre-enforcement judicial review and whether such preclusion
violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 25

" 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2013).
8 Scket,
20
21
22

132 S. Ct. at 1371.

Id. at 1372.
Id
Id. at 1373. The government's main contention is that, in enforcing the Act, the EPA is

allowed to bring either a civil or administrative action, and allowing for judicial review
undermines the latter, rendering such administrative actions ineffective and inefficient.
23 Id at 1371.
25

Id
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Durin oral arguments, the EPA faced immediate hostility from the
nine Justices.
Justice Scalia, when questioning the EPA's counsel as to
the contents of the compliance order, interrupted the EPA's argument,
saying "it shows the high-handedness of the agency, it seems to me,
putting in there stuff that is simply not required by the EPA."27 After
EPA's counsel suggested that he personally would have complied with the
order, Chief Justice Roberts responded sarcastically, "That's what you
would do? You would say: I don't think there are wetlands on my
property, but EPA does. So ... I'll just do what the government tells me I
should do." 28 Justice Alito posed a similar sarcastic question and answer,
"somebody from the EPA says we think that your backyard is a wetlands;
so, don't build. So ... what does the homeowner do, having bought that
property? . . . 'well, all right, I'm just going to put it aside as a nature
preserve."' 29 Justice Breyer attacked the EPA's counsel on APA
reviewability stating, "for 75 years the courts have interpreted statutes
with an eye towards permitting judicial review, not the opposite ... So, I
read the order. It looks like about as final a thing as I've ever seen." 30
Predictably, the Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit's decision,
finding the EPA's compliance order issued to the Sacketts by the EPA was
a final agency decision and subject to judicial review under the APA31

9ReTranscript of Oral Argument, supra note 3.
Id at 35. Justice Scalia, using the phrase "stuff that is simply not required by the
EPA," was referring to the compliance order's requirement that the Sackett's plant plants
on their lot. Id
28 Id at 36-37.
29 Id at 38.
30 Id at 41.
31Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012).
26
27
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Clean Water Act
Congress passed the CWA in 1972 with the goal of "restor[ing]
and maintain[ing the chemical, physical and biological integrity of [the]
Nation's waters. 2 Among its principal provisions for accomplishing this
goal is Section 301 of the Act, which forbids "the discharge of any
pollutant by any person," without a permit, into "navigable waters."33
Pollutant is broadly defined to include, in addition to traditional pollutants,
"dredged soil . . . rock, sand, cellar dirt" and other forms of waste. 34

Under Section 404 of the Act, persons may receive a permit "for the
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified
Section
disposal sites" from the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps").
402 of the Act, known as the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES"), requires all industrial facilities discharging any
pollutant (other than dredge and fill) from any point source into "waters of
the United States" to obtain, a permit. 36 NPDES permit holders are
required to meet technology-based and emission-based standards
stipulated by their permit. 37

32

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2013).
§§ 1311(a), 1362(12).
§ 1362(6).

3 Id
4 Id

s Id at § 1344(a).
Id § 1342; se also ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, WATER PERMIrING 101

36

(2012), availableat http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/101pape.pdf [hereinafter WATER
PERMITING]. Common examples of "facilities that discharge pollutants from a point
source" are municipal utilities and confined animal feeding operations.
" WATER PERMITTING, supra note 36. "The permit provides two levels of control:
technology-based limits (based on the ability of dischargers in the same industrial
category to treat [the discharged] wastewater) and water quality-based limits (if
technology-based limits are not sufficient to provide protection of the water body)." Id
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B. The Clean Water Act's JurisdictionalReach
The CWA's jurisdiction extends to "navigable waters," which are
defined as "waters of the United States." 3 8 The current Corps regulations
"interpret 'the waters of the United States' to extend CWA jurisdiction to,
in addition to traditional interstate navigable waters, 39 'all interstate waters
including interstate wetlands,' 40 'all other waters such as intrastate lakes . .
. the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or
foreign commerce,'

. . .

and 'wetlands adjacent to such waters and

tributaries."'41 Wetlands are defined as "those areas that are inundated or
saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient
to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence
of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.,42 I

Phpanos v. United Sates Army Corps of Enginees; the Supreme Court

attempted to provide more clarity as to the jurisdictional reach of the

CWA under these regulations. 43
In Rapanos John Rapanos filled in three separate sites
compromisin fifty-four acres of land "with sometimes-saturated soil
conditions.'
These parcels of land lay near ditches, drains, or a series of
both that allowed water to flow into traditional navigable waters subject to
the CWA.45 For these reasons, the Corps deemed the land as "wetlands"
subject to the CWA's jurisdiction.4 6 The Corps brought a Section 309
enforcement action against Rapanos for discharging dredge and fill
materials without a Section 404 permit. 47 Rapanos argued his lands did
" 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).

33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1) (2013).
Id. § 328.3(a)(2).
41
Rapanos y. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 724 (2006).
42 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b).
3
40

43

Repanos 547 U.S. at 715.

4

Id at 719-20.

45

Id. at 715.

Id at 720-21.
47 Id. at 729.
46
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not fall within the CWA's jurisdiction because "navigable waters" and
"waters of the United States must be limited to waters that are navigable in
fact or susceptible of being rendered so." 48 The district court held
Rapanos liable for violating the CWA because his lands fell under the
CWA's urisdiction as wetlands "adjacent to other waters of the United
States.'
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
holding CWA jurisdiction existed because "there were hydrological
connections between all three sites and corresponding adjacent tributaries
of navigable waters."50
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Sixth Circuit
decision, finding the court applied the wrong standard in determining
Rapanos' wetlands to be "waters of the United States." 5' Justice Scalia,
writing for a plurality, created a two-pronged test for determining CWA
jurisdiction over wetlands, first, the wetland must be adjacent to "a
relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate
navigable waters"; and, second, the wetland must have a continuous
surface connection with the adjacent body of water, making it difficult to
determine where the 'water' ends and the 'wetland' begins."5 2 Justice
Kennedy, writing alone, wrote a concurring opinion that set forth a
"significant nexus" test. 53 Under the "significant nexus" test jurisdiction
may be asserted over those wetlands that "either alone or in combination
Id. at 730. For his defense, Rapanos citied the Supreme Courts 1871 decision in The
Daniel Ball, holding that "navigable waters of the United States" are waters which "are
navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water." The Daniel Ball, 77
U.S. 557, 563 (1870).
4 *hpano4547 U.S. at 729.
50 Id. at 729-30.
5 Id. at 730-32.
52 Id. at 742. This definition of "waters of the United States "refers to water as found in
"streams," "oceans," "rivers," "lakes," and "bodies" of water "forming geographical
features," and "excludes channels containing merely intermittent or ephemeral flow." Id
at 732-34.
48

1

Id. at 758-59.
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with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the
chemical, physical and biological integrity of... 'navigable waters'."54
Lower courts and the federal government have struggled in their
interpretation of the Rapanos decision. 5 While multiple courts have
found Kennedy's "significant nexus" test to be controlling, others have
found that jurisdiction may be obtained under either test.56 The EPA and
the Corps have stated their agencies will continue to assert jurisdiction
over waters satisfying either the plurality test or the "significant nexus"
test.5 7 The EPA has emphasized that it will make its jurisdictional
determinations on a case-by-case basis, making "full use of the authority
provided by the CWA to include waters within the scope of the Act, as
interpreted [in Aspanos]."8

$4

Id at 755.

" Jeff Cray, Clear as Mud: Newes Ninth Circuit Cam Interpreting TapanosTe for
Clean Wter Act Jurisdiction Offers Little Clarity, MARTINLAW.COM (Sept. 12, 2007),
http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20070912-cwa-interpretation.
56 Id "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds." Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). Courts interpreting Phpanoshave
differed in their interpretation of Marks Both the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have
found the "significant nexus" test to be controlling because it is most narrow in that it is
the most restrictive on government power. United States v. Gerke, 464 F.3d 723, 724-25
(7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Robinson, 521 F.3d 1319, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008). The
First, Third and Eighth Circuits found it would be inappropriate to apply Marks to
Rapanos and employed Justice Steven's reasoning in his Rapano'sdissent that
jurisdiction could be satisfied by either test. United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64
(1st Cir. 2006); U.S. v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 181-82 (3rd Cir. 2011); United States v.
Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009).
57

ENvIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, DRAFr GUIDANCE ON IDENTIFYING WATERS
PROTECTED BY THE CLEAN WATER ACT 2 (2011) available at

http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/wous guidance_4-2011 .pdf.
" Id Guidance for identifying waters subject to CWA jurisdiction has provided
discussion for the jurisdictional implications of both Thpanostests. Id
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C. Enforcenent of the Act
The CWA directs the EPA to enforce Section 301 by either issuing
an administrative compliance order or by initiating a civil action. 9 The
EPA may also issue compliance orders to Section 404 or NPDES permit
holders who fall out of compliance with the terms of their permit. 60 In the
case of dredge and fill violations, a compliance order may require a
landowner to cease discharge of dredge and fill materials, take action to
remove already present discharge, and otherwise restore the site to its
original condition. 61 If the EPA prevails in a civil action the CWA allows
for up to $37,500 per day in fines for each violation of the Act. 62 If the
EPA prevails against a person who has also failed to comply with a
compliance order the amount may be increased to $75,000 per day. 63

D. Judicial eview of Corrpliance Orders
Section 1369 of the CWA enumerates several EPA administrative
actions that may be subject to judicial review in a Federal district court.64
Section 309 compliance orders are not listed among those actions directly
subject to judicial review under the Act. Enforcement actions taken by
the EPA under the Act are normally subject to judicial review when the
EPA files suit in an EPA induced Section 309 civil action.6 6 Although the
Act does not expressly provide for judicial review of compliance orders,
nowhere does it explicitly preclude such judicial review.6 7

s9 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (2013).
6

61

Id. §§ 1319(a)(3), 1342(k), 1344(n).

action 404 Enforcerrart, EPA.Gov (Oct. 9, 2012),

http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/factl5.cfm.

33 U.S.C. § 1319(d); 28 U.S.C. § 2461(a) (2013); Sackett v. E.P.A., 132
S. Ct. 1367,
1370 (2012).
63 &kett, 132 S. Ct. at
1370.
665 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1).
62

/d

6

67

&ckedt, 132 S. Ct. at 1372.
Id. at 1373; ealso33 U.S.C. §1369.
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A statute separate from the CWA, the APA provides for judicial
review of any "final agency action[s] for which there [are] no other
adequate remedy in a court. ... " APA judicial review may be utilized
except to the extent that a statute precludes judicial review. 69 The
Supreme Court has held that "whether and to what extent a particular
statute precludes judicial review is determined not only from [the
statute's] express language" but from the statutory scheme as a whole.7 0
Furthermore the Court has said the APA creates "a presumption in favor
of judicial review of an administrative action" that "may be overcome by
inferences of intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole." 71
The APA allows a reviewing Federal judge to "hold unlawful and
set aside an agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary,
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion." 72 "An 'agency action' includes
the whole or a part of an agency ... order, license, sanction, . . or failure

to act."73 The Supreme Court has held an agency's action is final where it
"mark[s] the 'consummation' of the agency's decision making process" 74
and it is an action "by which 'rights or obligations have been determined,'
or from which 'legal consequences will flow."' 75
Although the text of the CWA does not bar pre-enforcement
review of compliance orders, every federal circuit court hearing the issue
has ruled they lack jurisdiction to do so because the CWA bars such
review. 76 In Fleth v. EPA the Seventh Circuit denied pre-enforcement
68
69
70

5 U.S.C. § 704 (2013).
Id.§ 701(a)(1).
Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345
(1984).

71Id at 349.

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
n Id. § 551(13).
74 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (citing Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)).
71 Binet, 520 U.S. at 178 (citing Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn.
v.
Rederiaktiebolaget
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
76
Kalmuss-Katz, spra note 6.
72
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review of a Section 404 CWA administrative compliance order for lack of
jurisdiction.7 7 In Reth, the EPA issued Harold Rueth a compliance order
condemning discharges by his develoRment company of dredged and fill
materials into EPA deemed wetlands. Rueth brought a claim in federal
district court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the EPA's
"unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction over [his development]."
The
EPA moved to dismiss the claim and the district court granted the motion
because the EPA had not "issued a final appealable order."80
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed on two grounds. First, the
Seventh Circuit reasoned "Congress intended [the CWA] to preclude
judicial review of an EPA compliance order unless the government
[initiates] an enforcement action." 8 ' This conclusion of the court rests on
the assumption that because Congress gave EPA the choice to either issue
a compliance order or file suit, judicial review would force the EPA into
court immediately, limiting the effectiveness of and therefore completely
undermine, the compliance order option. 82 Allowing judicial review
"would delay the agency's response in the same manner as litigation
contesting the extent of the EPA's jurisdiction." 83 The court extended this
preclusion to suits brought under the APA.8 4 Second, in addition to
holding that the CWA precludes judicial review, the Seventh Circuit
agreed with the district court that compliance orders are not a "final
agency decision" as required to bring suit under the APA.85

In City of Baton Rouge v. EPA the Fifth Circuit similarly denied
pre-enforcement judicial review of an order requiring compliance with an
" Rueth v. E.P.A., 13 F.3d at 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1993)
7

Id at 228.

79

/

80 Id

81 Id at 229.
82

Id at 230 (citing Hoffman Grp., Inc. v. E.P.A., 902 F.2d 567, 569 (7th Cir. 1990)).

83 Ii(h, 13 F.3d at 230 (citing S. Pines Assoc. v. United States, 912 F.2d 713, 717 (4th

Cir. 1990)).
845
85

h, 13 F.3d at 231.

Id
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EPA issued NPDES permit.8 6 In Baton Rouge the EPA issued the City of
Baton Rouge a NPDES permit requiring the city to keep human waste
from its treatment facility out of the Mississippi River.8 7 After the city
violated this permit on forty-nine separate occasions the EPA issued a
compliance order requiring them to submit a plan for a program for
preventing the discharge of waste within thirty days.8 8 The city
immediately filed a petition for review of the order in the Fifth Circuit.
The EPA filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction to review the
administrative compliance order. 89
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the EPA and dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction. In doing so, the court held with the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in establishing a rule that "the
Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction for direct review only of those EPA
actions specifically enumerated in 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)." 90 The court
explained that "none of the specific clauses in section 1369(b)(1) describe
the issuance of an order . . . requiring compliance with a NPDES

permit." 9 '
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In %cket v. EPA, the United States Supreme Court overturned the
Ninth Circuit's dismissal of an APA challenge to an administrative
compliance order, holding such orders are in fact subject to judicial
review.92 Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous court, set forth an
opinion rejecting a series of the EPA's arguments against APA judicial
86

87

88

City of Baton Rouge v. E.P.A., 620 F.2d 478, 479 (5th Cir. 1980).

Id
Id. Specifically, the order directed Baton Rouge to submit a program for preventing

bypassing of the sewer system due to power failures and to submit copies of contracts,
work
orders, and purchase orders needed to execute the program. Id
8
9

Id
9 Id at 480.
91 Id
92

%Ckett, 132 S. Ct. 1367.
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review of an EPA compliance order. 93 Specifically, the Court held an
EPA compliance order is a "final agency decision," that the CWA does
not preclude judicial review, and that a compliance order is thus subject to
judicial review under the APA.9 4
On appeal from the Ninth Circuit, the Sacketts were granted
certiorari on two issues: whether the APA precludes judicial review of
EPA compliance orders under the CWA; and whether such preclusion
violates the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. 95 Because the Court
found in favor of the Sacketts on the first issue, it did not need to address
the second issue. Instead, the Court focused on whether an EPA
compliance order is a final agency decision subject to APA judicial
review, and whether the CWA expressly or impliedly precludes judicial

review.96
The EPA advanced several arguments as to why an EPA
compliance order is not subject to APA review.9 7 The EPA contended the
compliance order was not a final agency action because the order invited
the Sacketts to engage in an informal hearing with the EPA to discuss any
allegations they believed to be inaccurate.9 8 The EPA also cited the
APA's judicial review provision requiring a person seeking APA review
to have first exhausted his administrative remedies. 99
The Court rejected the informal review argument, holding the
compliance order constituted a final agency decision because legal
consequences could flow from the Sackett's failure to restore their
property and the order's issuance was the "consummation" of the agency's

Id
Id at 1374.
s Id at 1371.
96
Id
97 Id at 1373.
9

94

98 Id at
99 Id

1372.
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decision-making process. 00 Furthermore, the Court found no merit to the
Government's citation of its own "informal review" clause writing, "that
confers no entitlement to further agency review. The mere possibility that
an agency might reconsider in the light of informal discussion and invited
contentions of inaccuracy does not suffice to make an otherwise final
agency action nonfinal."101 The Court also held the Sacketts had no other
remedy in court because their alternative, litigating an action brought by
the EPA under 33 U.S.C. § 1319, would require them to accrue further
liability until the EPA decided to initiate the action.102
The Court also found no merit to the EPA's arguments that the

CWA precludes APA review. 10 3 Citing Block v. Corrrnunity Nutrition
Institutl 04 the Court reaffirmed that the APA creates a presumption
favoring judicial review of an administrative action. 0 5 Even though the
Block presumption "may be overcome by inferences of intent drawn from
the statutory scheme as a whole," the EPA's arguments did not support

this inference.106
On this question, the EPA set forth a series of arguments that the
CWA creates a statutory scheme precluding APA judicial review. First,
the EPA pointed to 33 U.S.C. § 1319, which gives the EPA discretion
under the CWA to issue a compliance order or to bring a civil action to
enforce the Act.'07 The EPA argued that allowing judicial review on
enforcement instruments undermines the purpose of the compliance order

10oid
101 Id

at 1371.
at 1372.

102Id ("...the Sacketts cannot initiate that process, and each day they wait for the agency
to drop the hammer, they accrue, by the Government's telling, an additional $75,000 in

liability").
notential
o3 Id at 1373-74.
4 Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
10 Sackett, 132 S. Ct. 1372-74.
106 Id at 1373-74.
107 Id at 1373.
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as an alternative to litigation. os Secondly, the EPA argued that due to
Congress expressly granting judicial review in other provisions of the
CWA, Congress meant to preclude judicial review of compliance
orders.1 09 Thirdly, the EPA argued Congress passed the CWA to increase
the efficiency of remedies for water pollution, and the EPA is far less
likely to use these orders if they are subject to judicial review.110
The Court rejected all three of these arguments, noting that the
CWA does not expressly preclude judicial review."11 Responding to the
first argument, the Court wrote that allowing judicial review of
compliance orders would not undermine their purpose because compliance
orders are useful in ways other than insulation from judicial review, and
the CWA does not guarantee a compliance order will always be the most
effective choice.11 2 The Court held the express prescription of judicial
review in select provisions of the CWA does not moot the APA's
presumption of APA review for all final agency action.1 13 Lastly, for the
sake of argument, the Court wrote, "the APA's presumption of judicial
review is a repudiation of the principle that efficiency of regulation
conquers all. And there is no reason to think that [the Clean Water Act]
was uniquely designed to enable the strong-arming of regulated
parties."ll 4 The Court again noted compliance orders would continue to
be an effective means of securing voluntary compliance.115
In sum, the Court concluded the compliance order, in this case,
was a final agency action for which there was no other adequate remedy
Id
' 09 Id
0 Id. at 1374.
108

..Idat 1373-74.
112 Id (explaining that compliance orders will still be
most efficient and useful in cases of
voluntary compliance.)
113 Id ("If the express provision ofjudicial review
in one section of a long and
complicated statute were alone enough to overcome the APA's presumption of
reviewability for all final agency action, it would not be much of a presumption at all.")
114 Id at 1374.

15 Id
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other than APA judicial review, and the CWA does not preclude that
review. 16 The Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit decision."
Two justices wrote concurring opinions. Justice Ginsburg praised
the majority for holding that the Sacketts may immediately seek judicial
review of the EPA's jurisdiction to issue a compliance order." 8 However,
her opinion stresses that the only issue before the Court was judicial
review of the EPA's CWA jurisdictional determination.1 9 Justice
Ginsburg would hold the majority opinion does not extend to allow
judicial review of the terms and conditions of compliance orders.' 2 0
Justice Alito wrote that the majority holding will protect the property
rights of ordinary Americans from harsh EPA determinations but labeled
the opinion as "a modest measure of relief."l 2 1 After referring to the reach
of the CWA as "notoriously unclear," Justice Alito charged Congress to
take action to provide a clear definition of the Act's jurisdictional reach.122
V. COMMENT

The Supreme Court's ruling constitutes a major change in federal
statutory and case law surrounding EPA-issued compliance orders. The
Court needed to address three main issues created by thirty years of
district and circuit court rulings to hold that the CWA does not preclude
APA judicial review of administrative compliance orders. The issues the
Court needed to resolve were: (1) whether a Section 309 compliance order
constitutes a "final agency action" for APA purposes; (2) whether the

"16 Id
117 Id
us Id. at 1374-75 (Ginsburg, J. concurring).
119 Id
120 Id
121 Id at 1375 (Alito, J. concurring).
122 /d
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Sacketts had no other remedy in court under the CWA; and (3) whether
the CWA's statutory scheme precludes APA judicial review.123
The Court's holding that a compliance order marks the
"consummation" of the EPA's decision-making process and that legal
consequences flow from that decision disposes of the first issue. 124 This
overrules reasoning in circuit court cases like Fhath, supra, that
compliance orders are not final agency actions because they only "mark
the beginning of the administrative process."' 25 On the second issue, the
Court overruled precedent also utilized in Rieth that judicial review is
precluded because its challenger's proper remedy is to wait for the EPA to
file an enforcement action. 6 The Court recognized that because a
compliance order recipient cannot initiate such an action, she is required to
accrue large penalties until the EPA initiates such the enforcement
action.127 Lastly the Court did away with the reasoning that the CWA
precludes judicial review by applying the precedent set in Block v.

Cormunity Nutrition Institute rather than the more stringent standard
employed by lower courts in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.128 The
Court essentially rejected past inferences of exclusion utilized by circuit
courts, and most importantly rejected the reasoning that allowing judicial
123

Id; ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH

SERV., R42450, THE SUPREME COURT

ALLOWS PRE-ENFORCEMENT JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 404

COMPLIANCE ORDERS: SACKETT v. EPA 4 (2012), available at

www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/R42450.pdf.
124 %cket. 132 S. Ct.
at 1371-72.
125 Rih, 13 F.3d at 231 (citing Howell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 794 F. Supp
1072, 1075 (D.N.M. 1992)).
126 ConpareCedt, 132 S. Ct. at 1372 (2012) (rejecting the argument that judicial
review is predicated upon agency enforcement action) Wth Reuth, 13 F.3d at 229 (1993)
(stating that judicial review was preculuded until comencment of agency enforcement
action).
127 adCedt, 132 S. Ct. at 1372.
128 Id at 1372-73 (citing Block v. Cmty. Nutrition
Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984), as creating
a "presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action." ); Ridh, 13 F.3d
at 231, (citing Abbott Laboratories v.Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), requiring the court
determine whether or not Congress intended to allow pre-enforcement review before
deciding to review a regulation that has not been enforced).
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review of compliance orders undermines the choice between compliance
orders and enforcement actions.' 29
Although the Court's holding is a major change in statutory federal
law, the opinion on its face offers little protection to those harmed by
frivolously issued compliance orders. The Court did not reach the larger
issue on which it granted certiorari, whether or not statutory preclusion of
judicial review violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. The
result handed down was a narrow opinion that may leave many CWA
compliance orders precluded from review. Furthermore, property owners
seeking judicial review of a compliance order are still left with the
difficult task of litigating the muddled jurisdiction of the CWA. As an
official from the EPA's water enforcement division stated, "[w]hat's
available after Sackett? Pretty much everything that was available before
Sackett. Internally, it's same old, same old."l 30

A. The Court Conpletay Ignored the Fifth Amendrrnt
Due Process Issle
Had the Court reached this larger issue raised by the Sacketts, that
statutory preclusion of pre-enforcement judicial review of compliance
orders violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, its ruling would
be a change of substantial breadth. Such a ruling would not only have
allowed judicial review of Section 309 CWA compliance orders, but
would likely extend judicial review to any other act enforced through
similar compliance orders. Even orders issued under acts that expressly
preclude judicial review of compliance orders would be reviewable.

Sacket, 132 S. Ct. at 1373; RAeth, 13 F.3d at 229.
130 Kevin Richert, Rach, Crapo, GOP senatorsquestionEPA reponse to Stakett casg
129

IDAHO STATESMAN (May 31, 2012, 3:24 PM),
http://voices.idahostatesman.com/2012/05/3 1/krichert/risch-crapo-gop-senators-questio
n~eparesponse-sackett case.
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The fact that the Court did not resolve this due process issue is of
no surprise.131 The Court typically skates around constitutional questions
where they do not have to be answered.132 This practice of judicial
prudence was appropriate because once the Court found that review under
the CWA was not foreclosed the due process challenge became moot.
If the Court had answered this question it may have been considered an
advisory opinion.134 In the future this issue may have its day in court with
a challenge to a statute that expressly precludes pre-enforcement review,
such as the CERCLA.13 5
B. The Court's Opinion is Narrowly Tailoredto Review of

Jurisdiction
The majority opinion utilized language that suggests CWA judicial
review be applied narrowly, "[w]e conclude that the compliance order in
this cas is final agency action or which there is not adequate remedy
other than APA review, and that the CWA does not preclude that
review."1 36 Perhaps the most narrowing aspect of the majority opinion is
that it fails to resolve the issue of whether the right to judicial review
extends to review of the terms and conditions of compliance orders.' 37
131 MELTZ,
132

/d

133

/d

supra note 123, at 4.

Article III of the Constitution grants federal courts the power to determine
a "case" or
"controversy." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Muskrat v. U.S., 219 U.S. 346, 356-357 (1911).
Where no "case or controversy" exists between litigants a federal court lacks jurisdiction.
Id Where a court lacking jurisdiction renders a determination that "judgment [can] not
be executed, and amounts in fact to no more than an expression of opinion upon the
validity of the acts in question." Id Once the Court held that the CWA does not preclude
judicial review of compliance orders, the "controversy" of whether or not preclusion
violates the Due Process Clause no longer existed. If the Court had then decided to rule
on the issue of Due Process, it would have lacked jurisdiction to do so, and its ruling
would have been merely an expression of opinion, i.e., an advisory opinion.
13542 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2013).
3 3rckett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374; MELTZ, alpranote 124, at 3.
134
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The Sacketts petitioned the Court asking for judicial review of the EPA's
jurisdiction "wetlands" determination, not the specific terms of the
order.'3 8 Justice Ginsburg suggested in her concurrence that the majority
opinion grants judicial review for determining the EPA's power to assert
jurisdiction under the CWA, not to the terms and conditions of the
order.' 39 Justice Alito's concurrence elaborated, "the Court's decision
provides a modest measure of relief. At leas, property owners like [the
Sacketts] will have the right to challenge the EPA's jurisdictional
determination under the [APA]."l 4 0
If post-Sackett district and circuit courts interpret the Courts ruling
as only granting judicial review of the EPA's jurisdiction to issue a
compliance order, a large majority of CWA compliance orders will be still
be precluded from review. Where compliance orders are issued to CWA
permit holders, the EPA has already obtained jurisdiction over the permit
holder's property.
Under this interpretation, permit violators subjected to superfluous
compliance order requirements would still be barred from seeking judicial
review of those requirements, whether or not the EPA properly determined
CWA jurisdiction before issuing the permit. This would be true even if
the requirements of the compliance order could be deemed "arbitrary and

capricious" under the APA. In City of Baton Rouge v. EPA supra, the
city sought judicial review of a compliance order's requirement that they
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/environmental/news.html. Although the
issue was not directly before it, the fact that the Court did not at least mention judicial
review for the content and requirements of compliance orders is surprising. At oral
argument, many of the Justices' attacked at the EPA's counsel and alluded to the
unlawful requirements of the Sackett's compliance order. Transcript of Oral Argument,
spranote 3, at 35-42. Specifically, the justices did not showed hostility towards the
order's requirement that the Sackett's plant vegetation, fence off their land, and refrain
from making use of it for three years. Id
138Sckett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
139 Id at 1374 (Ginsburg J., concurring).
140 Id at 1375 (Alito, J. concurring).
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design and implement a plan to overhaul their sewer system within thirty
days.141 Like Sacketts, the City of Baton Rouge faced accrual of
substantial penalties for failing to comply with the order until the EPA
brought a Section 309 enforcement action in district court. %ckett likely
does not overrule cases like Baton Rouga
By potentially only providing for jurisdictional review the Court
likely excluded a large majority of compliance orders from the judicial
review they sought to create. If the %ckett opinion is interpreted
narrowly, as the Court suggests it should be, NPDES, Section 402, and
Section 404 permit holders may still be subject to accrual of substantial
penalties for failure to comply with compliance orders until they can
litigate the orders requirements in an EPA brought enforcement action.
This issue is sure to be litigated in the future; current CWA permit holders
may even assert a right to retroactively review of past EPA jurisdictional
determinations that brought them under the scope of the CWA.
C. The DecisionDoes Nothing to Mend the CWA's Lack of

Jurisdictional Clarity
Although this issue was not before the Court, the CWA's lack of
jurisdictional clarity may render judicial review insubstantial. Even
though the Acketts have won a large battle they must still litigate the
merits of their case in district court.' 2 Specifically, the Sacketts are now
left with the great burden of roving their property does not contain
wetlands subject to the CWA.14 The EPA's jurisdiction under the CWA
is notoriously unclear and vast; proving that a property is not subject to the
CWA is extremely difficult.144
The legal arsenal for litigants challenging an EPA or Corps
jurisdictional determination consists of the vague CWA statutory and
141 City of Baton Ibugg 620
142 MELTZ, supranote 123,

143

Id

F.2d at 479.
at 5.

'" dCett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 (Alito, J., concurring).
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regulatory scheme, the Supreme Court's fractured decision in AIsparos
and a widely varied collection of post-Manos Federal circuit court
decisions. The Court heavily justified its granting of judicial review by
reassuring "compliance orders will remain an effective means of securing
prompt voluntary compliance in those many cases where there is no
substantial basis to question their validity." This statement, however,
illustrates exactly how compliance orders will continue to be oppressive.
Because courts and the federal government have failed to provide a clear
substantial legal basis to challenge the jurisdictional power of the CWA,
voluntary compliance will still be forced in most cases, even where not
warranted. With no clear definition of the CWA's jurisdictional reach,
recipients of compliance orders still lack a strong substantial basis to
question their compliance order's validity, undermining their newly
obtained right of judicial review.
As Justice Alito wrote in his concurring opinion, "Any piece of
land that is wet at least part of the year is in danger of being classified by
EPA employees as wetlands covered by the Act."l 45 "The uncertain reach
of the [CWA] and the draconian penalties imposed for the sort of
violations alleged in this case still leaves most property owners with little
practical alternative to dance to the EPA's tune."1 46 The issue of
jurisdictional reach was not before the court and therefore was
appropriately not addressed by the majority opinion. That being said, the
issue is important in considering the practical effect of the Sckett
decision. "Real relief requires Congress to do what is should have done in
the first place: provide a reasonably clear rule regarding the reach of the
Clean Water Act."l 47
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VI.

CONCLUSION

The
ckett decision is a major change in federal and statutory law,
and the court practiced appropriate judicial prudence in addressing the
issue before it. This being so, the opinion takes only baby steps towards
relief for those improperly swept under the jurisdiction of the CWA.
Recipients of CWA compliance orders who feel the EPA has wronged
them may still have substantially the same remedies they had before
Sdw it. What the Court's opinion is sure to do is spark further litigation
over the extent of compliance order reviewability and the CWA's
jurisdictional reach. Although many will criticize this opinion for doing
too little, it was of an opinion of appropriate breadth and may spur lower
courts and the Federal government to resolve the enduring issue of CWA's
notoriously unclear jurisdictional reach.14 8
JOHN W. SHIKLES
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